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ABSTRACT
In June 2016, Apple made a bold announcement that it will deploy
local differential privacy for some of their user data collection in
order to ensure privacy of user data, even from Apple [21, 23].
The details of Apple’s approach remained sparse. Although several
patents [17–19] have since appeared hinting at the algorithms that
may be used to achieve differential privacy, they did not include
a precise explanation of the approach taken to privacy parameter
choice. Such choice and the overall approach to privacy budget use
and management are key questions for understanding the privacy
protections provided by any deployment of differential privacy.
In this work, through a combination of experiments, static and
dynamic code analysis of macOS Sierra (Version 10.12) implemen-
tation, we shed light on the choices Apple made for privacy budget
management. We discover and describe Apple’s set-up for differen-
tially private data processing, including the overall data pipeline,
the parameters used for differentially private perturbation of each
piece of data, and the frequency with which such data is sent to
Apple’s servers.
We find that although Apple’s deployment ensures that the (dif-
ferential) privacy loss per each datum submitted to its servers is 1
or 2, the overall privacy loss permitted by the system is significantly
higher, as high as 16 per day for the four initially announced appli-
cations of Emojis, New words, Deeplinks and Lookup Hints [21].
Furthermore, Apple renews the privacy budget available every day,
which leads to a possible privacy loss of 16 times the number of
days since user opt-in to differentially private data collection for
those four applications.
We applaud Apple’s deployment of differential privacy for its
bold demonstration of feasibility of innovation while guaranteeing
rigorous privacy. However, we argue that in order to claim the full
benefits of differentially private data collection, Apple must give full
transparency of its implementation and privacy loss choices, enable
user choice in areas related to privacy loss, and set meaningful
defaults on the daily and device lifetime privacy loss permitted.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Differential privacy [7] has been widely recognized as the lead-
ing statistical data privacy definition by the academic commu-
nity [6, 11]. Thus, as one of the first large-scale commercial de-
ployments of differential privacy (preceded only by Google’s RAP-
POR [10]), Apple’s deployment is of significant interest to privacy
theoreticians and practitioners alike. Furthermore, since Apple may
be perceived as competing on privacy with other consumer com-
panies, understanding the actual privacy protections afforded by
the deployment of differential privacy in its desktop and mobile
OSes may be of interest to consumers and consumer advocate
groups [16].
However, Apple’s publicly-facing communications about its de-
ployment of differential privacy have been extremely limited: nei-
ther its developer documents [1, 2, 21, 22, 24] nor interstitials
prompting the users to opt-in to differentially private data col-
lection (Figures 8 and 9) provide details of the technology, except to
say what data types it may be applied to. Two aspects of the deploy-
ment are crucial to understanding its privacy merits: the algorithms
or processes used to ensure differential privacy of the data being
sent and the privacy parameters being used by those algorithms.
Although one can speculate about the algorithms deployed based
on the recent patents [17–19], the question of parameters used to
govern permitted privacy loss remains open and is our primary
focus.
Both EFF and academics have called for Apple to detail its privacy
budget use [3, 8, 16, 20], to no avail1. As far as we are aware, we
are the first to systematically study privacy budget use in Apple’s
deployment of differential privacy.
1.1 The (Differential) Privacy Budget
One of the core distinctions of differential privacy (DP) from col-
loquial notions of privacy is that the definition provides a way to
quantify the privacy risk incurred whenever a differentially private
algorithm is deployed. Typically called privacy budget or privacy
loss and denoted by ϵ , it quantitatively measures by how much the
risk to an individual privacy may increase due to that individual’s
data inclusion in the inputs to the algorithm. The higher the value
of ϵ , the less privacy protection is provided by the algorithm; in
particular, the increase in privacy risks is proportional to exp(ϵ).
Although the choice of ϵ is typically treated as a social choice by
1Apple’s only public comments on the privacy budget are “Restrict the number of
submissions made during a period. No identifiers. Periodically delete donations from
server" [21].
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the theoretical computer scientists [6], it is of crucial importance in
practical deployments, as the meaning of a privacy risk of exp(1)
vs exp(50) is radically different.
In practice, an individual’s data contribution is rarely limited to
one datum. Whenever multiple data are submitted with differen-
tial privacy, the overall differential privacy loss incurred by that
individual is viewed as bounded by the sum of the privacy losses
of each of the submissions, due to what is known as composition
theorems [9, 15]. Hence, understanding the privacy implications of
a deployed system such as Apple’s, requires not only understanding
the privacy loss incurred per datum submitted, but also how many
datums may be submitted per time period or over a lifetime of
a user’s device. In fact, the need to understand the total privacy
loss of differential privacy deployments has prompted Dwork and
Mulligan to propose an “Epsilon Registry" [8].
1.2 Our Findings
We find that although the privacy loss per datum is strictly limited
to privacy budgets typically used in the literature, the daily pri-
vacy loss permitted by the implementation exceeds values typically
considered acceptable by the theoretical community [12], and the
overall privacy loss per device may be unbounded (Section 4).
2 OVERVIEW
2.1 System Components
We start by listing the components of the DP system on Mac OS
we have identified:
• The differential privacy framework, located at /System/
Library/PrivateFrameworks/DifferentialPrivacy.framework.
The framework contains code implementing differential pri-
vacy, which we will decompile with Hopper Disassembler. In
particular, it contains code responsible for per-datum priva-
tization and for periodic functions that manage the privacy
budget, updates of the database for privatized data, and cre-
ation of report files to be submitted to Apple servers.
• The com.apple.dprivacyd daemon handling differential pri-
vacy, located at /usr/libexec/dprivacyd. We will study it using
code tracing with LLDB.
• A database, located at /private/var/db/DifferentialPrivacy,
which contains several tables of privatized records and a
table related to available budget per record type. Anyone
with sudo privileges can open the database using sqlite3.
We will study its contents (Section 3.1) and the changes to
them due to usage of features that are supposed to trigger
differentially private data collection and over time.
• Configuration files (Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7) with extension .plist,
located at /System/Library/DifferentialPrivacy/Configuration/.
The four files, which can be inspected by anyone but are
difficult to change, specify numerous parameters that config-
ure the actions of the DP framework, such as the per datum
privacy parameter, privacy budget increase rate, etc. We will
study the effects of each of these parameters by changing
them and observing their effects during code execution with
LLDB and through the resulting report files produced.
• Report files (Figure 11) with extensions .dpsub and .json.anon,
located at /Library/Logs/DiagnosticReports/ and
/private/var/db/DifferentialPrivacy/Reports/. These files con-
tain privatized data and are the ones transmitted to Apple’s
servers. They can be openedwith a text editor, and the .dpsub
files can also be inspected through the MacOS Console under
System Reports. We will study when they get created, their
contents, and when they get deleted through observations
and experiments.
• The MacOS Console (Figure 21), which contains messages
mentioning differential privacy, either in the library or pro-
cess name. The messages are timestamped and easily read-
able, and are thus useful in noting certain system actions.
2.2 System Organization and Data Pipeline
The dprivacy (com.apple.dprivacyd) daemon runs the system re-
sponsible for implementation of differential privacy. Once a user
opts-in to differentially private data collection in the MacOS Secu-
rity & Privacy Settings (Figure 8), the dprivacy daemon is enabled
and the database that will be supporting relevant data storage and
management is created in /var/db/DifferentialPrivacy. Furthermore,
there’s a message visible on Console: “dprivacyd: accepting work
now".
Per Apple’s original announcement [1, 21, 23], the use of DP is
focused on four applications: new words, emojis, deeplinks, and
lookup hints in Notes, with iCloud data added as an additional
application in early 2017 [2], and further types of data collection
such as health data introduced in mid-2017 [24]. We observed how
to reliably trigger DP-related activity when entering new words
and emojis2; thus, our conclusions will be based on experiments
with those applications.
Whenever a user enters an emoji or a previously unseen new
word in Notes, the relevant datum is perturbed using a differentially
private algorithm and its privatized version and some metadata are
added to a corresponding database table.
A ReportGenerator task (Figure 10) is run periodically, at which
point some records from the database are selected and written
to report files (Figure 11), which are then transmitted to Apple’s
servers. The table rows corresponding to the selected records are
“marked as submitted" and eventually deleted from the database by
a task.
There are several other periodicmaintenance tasks, whose effects
are: to delete records from the database (even those that weren’t
submitted) and to delete report files from disk. These periodic tasks
are accompanied bymessages observable on the Console (Figure 21).
2.3 Study Questions
In order to understand the privacy loss in Apple’s implementation
of differential privacy, we need to understand the following aspects
of the system:
(1) What are the privacy parameters used in order to achieve
privatization before the privatized datum gets entered into
the database? This will let us understand per datum privacy.
2To reliably trigger DP application to emojis, the user needs to call out the emoji
keyboard by pressing "ctrl-cmd space", then click an emoji (or select an emoji with the
arrow key and press "Enter"). For new words, the user can type an incorrectly spelled
word in the Notes app and then ignore the spelling suggestion by pressing ’esc’.
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(2) How frequently are records selected for inclusion in a report?
How many records can be included in one report? How
frequently are the reports created and submitted? This will
let us understand the rate of privacy loss.
(3) Is the total privacy loss that a particular user can incur lim-
ited?
(4) How easy is it to alter the performance of the system, e.g.,
change parameters responsible for each datum’s privatiza-
tion, change the number of records selected for inclusion
into a report or the frequency of report generation?
We discovered that the answers to questions (1) – (3) (see Sec-
tion 4) depend on the parameters specified in the configuration files
and their use by the framework to establish the available privacy
budget. We describe our findings and observations regarding the
database tables, configuration files, and the functionality related to
report generation and privacy budget maintenance next. We will
discuss (4) in Section 5.2.
3 SYSTEM’S DETAILS
3.1 The Database
The ZOBHRECORD (See Figure 1) and ZCMSRECORD tables in
the database store the perturbed data, with the former dedicated
to the privatized emoji records, and the latter – to the privatized
new words records. Every emoji typed by a user gets privatized
and stored in the ZOBHRECORD table. In contrast, only words
that haven’t been previously typed are privatized and stored in the
ZCMSRECORD table.
A notable table is ZPRIVACYBUDGETRECORD, whose schema
and example contents are shown in Figure 2. The table contains
7 entries, one for each of the applications (NewWords, Emoji, Ap-
pDeepLink, Search, and health) and two for helper functions (de-
fault and testBudget). The ZBALANCE column contains the integer
value of the currently available privacy budget for each application.
Figure 1: Schema and entries in the ZOBHRECORD table.
Figure 2: Schema of and privacy budget items from the ZPRI-
VACYBUDGETRECORD table.
3.2 Configuration Files
There are four configuration files for theDP daemon: com.apple.dprivacyd.
{keynames, keyproperties, algorithmparameters, budgetproperties}.plist.
See Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 for snippets of the configuration files,
Figure 3 for a schematic relationship between keys in them, and
Tables 1 and 2 for a snippet of their values.
3.2.1 KeyName→ PropertiesName. keynames.plist contains a
mapping of KeyNames to PropertiesNames. KeyNames describe the
possible data types, e.g.,
com.apple.keyboard.NewWords.en_US – a new word in English
using the US keyboard3, com.apple.keyboard.NewWords.en_GB –
a new word in English using the Great Britain keyboard,
com.apple.keyboard.NewWords.ru_RU – a new word in Russian,
com.apple.keyboard.Emoji.fr_FR.EmojiKeyboard – an emoji in French,
com.apple.parsec.AppDeepLink – a deeplink. In MacOS 10.12.3 key-
names.plist contains 160 distinct KeyNames.
Each KeyName is assigned one of 13 possible PropertiesName.
For example, KeyName com.apple.keyboard.NewWords.en_US has
a PropertiesNameNewWords, as do com.apple.keyboard.NewWords.en_GB
and com.apple.keyboard.NewWords.ru_RU;
KeyName com.apple.parsec.AppDeepLink has a PropertiesName
DeepLinks; KeyName com.apple.keyboard.Emoji.fr_FR.EmojiKeyboard
has a PropertiesName TermFrequency, as do
com.apple.keyboard.Emoji.ru_RU.EmojiKeyboard and
com.apple.keyboard.Emoji.en_US.EmojiKeyboard.
3.2.2 Determining the Per-Datum Privacy Loss: KeyName →
PropertiesName→ PrivatizationAlgorithm, PrivacyParameter. For
each of the 13 possible PropertiesName values, the keyproperties.plist
file specifies a PrivatizationAlgorithm and PrivacyParameter. For
example, for PropertiesName=HealthDataTypes: PrivatizationAlgo-
rithm=OneBitHistogram and PrivacyParameter=1; for Properties-
Name=NewWords: PrivatizationAlgorithm= CountMedianSketch
and PrivacyParameter=2; for PropertiesName= TermFrequency: Pri-
vatizationAlgorithm=OneBitHistogram and PrivacyParameter=1.
algorithmparameters.plist specifies additional parameters of the
privatization algorithm.
3.2.3 Determining a Budget for Particular Data Types: KeyName
→ PropertiesName→BudgetKeyName. Furthermore, for each of the
13 possible PropertiesName values, the keyproperties.plist file speci-
fies a BudgetKeyName. For example, for PropertiesName=LocalWords:
BudgetKeyName=com.apple.keyboard.NewWords; for Properties-
Name=NewWords: BudgetKeyName=com.apple.keyboard.NewWords;
for PropertiesName= DeepLinks: BudgetKeyName= com. apple. par-
sec. AppDeepLink; for PropertiesName=TermFrequency: BudgetKey-
Name=com.apple.keyboard.Emoji. In particular, this implies that
all new words, regardless of language, have the same BudgetKey-
Name=com.apple. keyboard. NewWords, all emojis – the same Bud-
getKeyName=com. apple.keyboard.Emoji, etc. There are a total of 7
distinct BudgetKeyNames, which is consistent with what we saw in
the ZPRIVACYBUDGETRECORD table in the database (Figure 2).
3We are not certain whether the second identifier encodes a keyboard preference or a
region preference, or both.
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KeyName PropertiesName Privatization-
Algorithm
Privacy-
Parameter
BudgetName Session-
Amount
com.apple.keyboard.NewWords.it_IT NewWords CountMedianSketch 2 com.apple.keyboard.NewWords 2
com.apple.keyboard.NewWords.ru_RU NewWords CountMedianSketch 2 com.apple.keyboard.NewWords 2
com.apple.keyboard.NewWords.zh_Hans NewWordsChinese CountMedianSketch 2 com.apple.keyboard.NewWords 2
com.apple.keyboard.LocalWords.en_US LocalWords CountMedianSketch 2 com.apple.keyboard.NewWords 2
com.apple.keyboard.Emoji.fr_FR.Emoji TermFrequency OneBitHistogram 1 com.apple.keyboard.Emoji 1
com.apple.parsec.AppDeepLink DeepLinks CountMedianSketch 1 com.apple.parsec.AppDeepLink 10
com.apple.health.datatypes HealthDataTypes OneBitHistogram 1 com.apple.health 2
com.apple.lookup.QueryMatch. query-
Only.notHighlighted
Search OneBitHistogram 1 com.apple.parsec.Search 1
com.apple.lookup.DomainMatch Search OneBitHistogram 1 com.apple.parsec.Search 1
Table 1: Values for particular KeyNames: PropertiesName, PrivatizationAlgorithm, PrivacyParameter and BudgetName
BudgetKeyName Session-
Seconds
Session-
Amount
com.apple.keyboard.Emoji 86400 1
com.apple.parsec.Search 86400 1
com.apple.keyboard.NewWords 86400 2
com.apple.parsec.AppDeepLink 86400 10
com.apple.health 604800 2
com.apple.differentialprivacy.testBudget 86400 4
com.apple.DifferentialPrivacy.default 86400 1
Table 2: Budget Properties as specified in budgetproper-
ties.plist configuration file on MacOS 10.12.3
Figure 3: Relation between KeyName, PropertiesName, Bud-
getKeyName, BudgetName, etc.
3.2.4 Budget Properties. The budgetproperties.plist file specifies
two quantities for each BudgetKeyName: SessionSeconds and Ses-
sionAmount (see Figure 7 for a snippet and Table 2 for the values).
SessionSeconds = 86400 for all BudgetKeyNames except
com.apple.health, for whom SessionSeconds = 604800. These corre-
spond to number of seconds in a day and in a week, respectively.
SessionAmount values range from 1 to 10, depending on Bud-
getKeyName (see Table 2).
Figure 4: Example of keynames.plist
Figure 5: Example of keyproperties.plist
4 PRIVACY LOSS FINDINGS
We now answer the questions posed in Section 2.3.
4.1 Each Datum’s Privatization
PrivacyParameter of the KeyName specifies the privacy pa-
rameter used for privatization of the datumof thatKeyName
prior to its addition to the database.
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Figure 6: Example of algorithmparameters.plist
Figure 7: Example of budgetproperties.plist
For example, for an emoji in French, Russian, or English, the
privatization algorithm that will be run is OneBitHistogram with
PrivacyParameter 1. For a new word in English using the US key-
board or a new word in Russian, the privatization algorithm that
will be run is CountMedianSketch with PrivacyParameter 2, etc.
See Table 1 for the PrivacyParameter values used for the various
datum types in Mac OS 10.12.3.
It is difficult to understand and verify correctness of the priva-
tization algorithms when one only has access to the binary code.
We expect that the algorithms implement the ideas described in the
patents [17–19]. What we do verify using LLDB and by changing
the PrivacyParameter in the configuration file and observing the
effects, is that the privacy parameter epsilon used for emoji and
new words privatization is what one would expect based on the
values in the configuration file (see Section A.1.1).
4.2 Report Generation and Privacy Budget
Management over Time
SessionAmount specifies how many records belonging to a
particular KeyName can be included in a report file. Session-
Amount also specifies the increase to the available budget
balance for each BudgetKeyName that happens every Ses-
sionSeconds.
4.2.1 Number of Records per Report. Specifically, Apple keeps
track of the privacy budget balance (ZBALANCE) available for
each of the 7 BudgetKeyNames in the ZPRIVACYBUDGETRECORD
database table. The available budget balance together with the
SessionAmount is used to decide how many records to include in
each report file. Specifically, every 18 hours, the daemon runs a
ReportGenerator task. It selects records from the database tables to
be included in the report according to the following:
• Atmostmin(SessionAmount, 40)4 records per KeyNamemay
be selected.
• The total number of records belonging to the same Bud-
getKeyName selected may not exceed the privacy budget bal-
ance for that BudgetKeyName currently available as per the
ZPRIVACYBUDGETRECORD table in the database. When
the number of records of a particular BudgetKeyName avail-
able in the database tables exceeds the available budget bal-
ance, then the subset of records whose total number does not
exceed the available budget balance are chosen at random
while taking into account SubmissionPriority.
Each record selected is “marked as submitted" in the correspond-
ing table in the database, and for each record submitted the corre-
sponding privacy budget balance is decreased by one.
The report files created contain the creation time (or creation
time adjusted forward by 7 hours) in the file name, and are placed in
the folder /Library/Logs/DiagnosticReports/ or /private/var/db/ Dif-
ferentialPrivacy/Reports/. Recordswith KeyNames that have TermFre-
quency, NewWords or LocalWords as their PropertiesName are
included in reports in the first folder; records with KeyNames that
have Search as PropertiesName – in the second folder.
4.2.2 Budget Increase. A periodic task PrivacyBudgetMainte-
nance increases the ZBALANCE value in the ZPRIVACYBUDGETRECORD
table for each BudgetKeyName by its corresponding SessionAmount
every SessionSeconds (see Section A.1.2 for experimental and code
evidence supporting this claim). Thus, for all BudgetKeyNames
except health and default, the available privacy budget balance is
increased by SessionAmount every 24 hours5. Due to OS sleep,
which is common on MacOS, in practice the daemon increases the
privacy budget balance by the SessionAmount multiplied by the
number of days that have elapsed since the last budget update (a
time which is kept track of in the database table).
When a user opts-in to differentially private data collection,
the budgets for each BudgetKeyName are initialized with their
corresponding SessionAmount.
4.2.3 Total Privacy Loss Permitted. Consider an example: a user
opts in to DP, then types one or several emoji every day for t days.
Since for emoji PrivacyParameter=1, every emoji will be put into
database after being privatized with privacy loss of 1. Since for
emoji the SessionAmount=1, the privacy budget balance will be
increased by one every day, and so every day one privatized emoji
will be included in a report sent to Apple’s servers. After t days,
by composition theorems [9, 15], the privacy loss incurred will be
1 · 1 · t = t .
4The number 40 is hard-coded in the binary code (Figure 13).
5The default and AppDeepLink BudgetKeyNames are the exceptions to this; the former
likely due to its role as a default value for abuse scenarios (Section 5.2) and the latter
due to DeepLink functionality not being present in MacOS 10.12.
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Consider another example: a user opts in to DP, but doesn’t use
any emoji for 20 days. The available privacy budget balance for
emoji will be 20 after that time. Then the user types two emoji
each in 10 different languages supported by differential privacy in
one day. Each of the 20 emojis will be put into the database after
being privatized with privacy loss of 1. In the first day, 10 different
emoji, one from each language (since SessionAmount = 1 for each
emoji KeyName and available privacy budget balance is 20), will be
included in the report, for a privacy loss of 10. The next day, the
remaining 10 different emoji will be included in the report, for an
additional privacy loss of 10.
In other words, the privacy loss for a particular application per-
mitted by the implementation is PrivacyParameter · SessionAmount
every SessionSeconds. The privacy loss that is not realized dur-
ing particular time period if that application is not used remains
available for future use. Thus, for the applications of NewWords,
AppDeepLink, Search, and Emoji, whose respective PrivacyParam-
eters are: 2, 1, 1, 1, and SessionAmounts are: 2, 10, 1, 1, and Session-
Seconds is 86,400 in MacOS 10.12.3, the overall daily privacy loss
permitted is 16. Moreover, since unused privacy budget balance
rolls over for subsequent use, the overall privacy loss of a device
for the four initially announced applications by Apple may reach
16 times the number of days since the user of the device has opted
in to DP. A caveat to these findings is that DeepLink functionality
does not appear to be implemented on MacOS yet, so the actual
privacy loss on Mac OS 10.12.3 is currently as large as 6 per day
and on iOS 10.1.1 – as large as 14 per day (Section 5.4) for the four
initially announced applications.
5 DISCUSSION
5.1 Report File and Database Maintenance
Besides the periodic tasks of ReportGenerator and PrivacyBudget-
Maintenance, whose actions have already been described in Sec-
tion 4.2, the following 3 periodic tasks are responsible for database
and report file management (Figure 10):
• StorageCulling (every 24 hours): deletes records that have
been submitted and records with the mismatched version
number from the database.
• StorageMaintenance (every 12 hours): deletes records to limit
database size and deletes records added to the database more
than two weeks before the current date.
• ReportFilesMaintenance (every 24 hours): removes report
files older than a month6 from disk.
5.2 Ease of Altering System’s Performance
We have observed several precautions that are implemented by
Apple in order to make it difficult to abuse the implementation:
• The configuration files are difficult to change, as such a
change on Mac OS requires turning off Apple’s System In-
tegrity Protection, which is not trivial. We have not found a
way to change the configuration files on iOS.
• Even if one succeeds in changing the configuration files,
whenever a PrivacyParameter in a configuration file is set
6Concluded based on observation and dynamic code analysis, as we could not find
this in the framework code.
to a value higher than epsilonMax, a constant value equal
to 2 which is hard-coded in the code of the framework (Fig-
ure 14), the PrivacyParameter used is defaulted to 1 at run-
time and the corresponding record’s Submission Priority is
set to 99999, effectively ensuring it does not get included in
report files. Furthermore, SessionAmount is defaulted to at
most 40 at runtime (Section 4.2).
• Time measures used by the daemon, such as the number of
seconds in 18 hours, in a day, in 7 days, are hardcoded in
the code (Section A.1.3). That may be the reason why we
have not succeeded in accelerating report file generation or
privacy budget increase by changing the SessionSeconds in
the configuration file or changing the computer’s clock.
On the other hand, anyone with root permissions can alter the pri-
vacy budget balance in the database, thereby artificially increasing
the privacy loss.
5.3 Configuration Differences between MacOS
versions
We observed that Apple made changed to configuration files from
MacOS 10.12.1 to 10.12.3 (see Table 3). The main distinctions are
that in MacOS 10.12.3:
• SessionAmount for com.apple.keyboard.NewWords increases
from 1 to 2, resulting in a higher daily privacy loss.
• BudgetName com.apple.health and PropertiesName Local-
Words are introduced, signaling new applications for DP.
• SubmissionPriority is adopted, signaling new protections
against abuse.
• Health-related PropertiesName and Budget are introduced,
signaling that health-related data will also be included in DP
data collection.
MacOS
10.12.1
MacOS
10.12.3
SessionAmount for NewWords 1 2
SessionAmount for testBudget 1 4
BudgetName com.apple.health no yes
PropertiesName LocalWords no yes
apple.photos.search.miss.unnormalized. en_US yes no
apple.photos.search.miss.normalized.en_US yes no
PropertiesName HealthDataTypes no yes
PropertiesName LocalWords no yes
SubmissionPriority no yes
Table 3: Configuration file difference betweenMacOS 10.12.1
and 10.12.3
5.4 A Note on iOS
Studying the iOS DP implementation is significantly more difficult.
From our observations of the Console messages when the iPhone
is connected to a computer running MacOS and of the reports
(observable under Settings→ Privacy→ Analytics→ Analytics
Data), the iOS implementation follows the same principles as the
MacOS one. The configuration files for iOS 10.1.1 we obtained from
a jailbroken phone were identical to those of MacOS 10.12.1. The
distinctions we found relate to iOS reports containing more metrics
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(in particular, we were not able to trigger DeepLink functionality
on MacOS while such records abound on iOS), and to faster report
file deletion from the phone than from the computer (7 vs 30 days).
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
We applaud Apple for its deployment of differential privacy in the
local privacy model and for the many safeguards put in place to
make it difficult to abuse. However, we believe the deployment has
several significant shortcomings.
(1) The privacy loss permitted by the system is not explained
anywhere and takes significant effort to reverse-engineer.
This is contrary to one of the main conceptual advantages
of differential privacy – that a user can make an informed
choice whether to opt-in to differentially private data collec-
tion based on the quantifiable knowledge of risk announced
by the data collector.
(2) Furthermore, the lack of transparency on privacy loss opens
the door for intentional or un-intentional abuse by Apple
itself, e.g., by unilaterally changing either the per-datum
privacy loss or the rate of privacy loss in a time period or by
introducing additional BudgetKeyName(s), Apple may sig-
nificantly weaken the privacy guarantees provided without
anyone’s knowledge or consent. In fact, this may already be
happening – by inspecting iOS 11 beta report files (Figure 12),
we have observed that the daily privacy loss permitted in-
creased by at least 29 compared to that of iOS 10.1.1 and
MacOS 10.12.3:
• the PrivacyParameter used for Emoji is 2 (instead of 1)
and as many as 10 records per Emoji KeyName (instead of
1 as in iOS 10.1.1 and MacOS 10.12.3) are included in one
report file;
• additional KeyNames, such as com.apple.safari.DomainVisited
and com.apple.safari.DomainCausingEnergyDrain, are in-
troduced, each using a PrivacyParameter of 1 and permit-
ting as many as 10 records for their BudgetKeyName per
report file.
(3) The privacy loss of 16 per day permitted by the system is
significantly higher than what is commonly considered rea-
sonable in academic literature. Furthermore, since the per-
mitted privacy loss balance is replenished every day, over
a course of time the total privacy loss per device becomes
larger by orders of magnitude.
(4) Due to the way the database and report files are structured,
the implementation leaks what features of MacOS a user is
using and in what language and, possibly, with what geo-
graphic and keyboard preference, both to Apple and to any-
one who has access to the database. Furthermore, because
only new words are privatized and added to the relevant
database tables, one can potentially test whether a particular
non-dictionary word has been ever used by the owner of the
device by observing whether typing it triggers changes to
the DP database.
We call for Apple to make its implementation of privacy-preserving
algorithms public and to make the rate of privacy loss fully trans-
parent and tunable by the user.
6.0.1 Future Work. Apple does not transmit any user or device
identifiers along with reports [21]. It would be worthwhile to in-
vestigate the effect that such (or other ways of) decoupling of data
source from data aggregator can play in mitigating the implications
of the (theoretically) infinitely increasing privacy loss [14].
It has been observed that properly implementing algorithms
claiming to preserve differential privacy is non-trivial in practice [4,
5, 13]. It would be worthwhile to develop further techniques for
verifying correctness of claimed DP implementations.
Finally, the question of how to intuitively interpret and convey
the privacy guarantees and limitations of differential privacy at
various privacy loss levels to the public, remains open.
REFERENCES
[1] Apple. 2016. Apple previews iOS 10, the biggest iOS release
ever. (June 2016). https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2016/06/
apple-previews-ios-10-biggest-ios-release-ever.html
[2] Apple. 2017. macOS Sierra: Share analytics information with Apple. (March
2017). https://support.apple.com/kb/PH25654?locale=en_US&viewlocale=en_US
[3] Greg Barbosa. Sep 26, 2016. Comment: Differential pri-
vacy and data collection is still not clearly defined as opt-
in on iOS 10. In 9to5Mac. https://9to5mac.com/2016/09/26/
comment-differential-privacy-and-data-collection-is-still-not-clearly-defined-opt-in-on-ios-10/
[4] Gilles Barthe, Marco Gaboardi, Emilio Jesús Gallego Arias, Justin Hsu, César
Kunz, and Pierre-Yves Strub. 2014. Proving Differential Privacy in Hoare Logic.
In Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE 27th Computer Security Foundations Symposium
(CSF). 411–424.
[5] Gilles Barthe, Marco Gaboardi, Benjamin Grégoire, Justin Hsu, and Pierre-Yves
Strub. 2016. Proving Differential Privacy via Probabilistic Couplings. In Proceed-
ings of the 31st Annual ACM/IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science (LICS).
749–758.
[6] Cynthia Dwork. 2011. A firm foundation for private data analysis. Commun.
ACM 54, 1 (2011), 86–95.
[7] Cynthia Dwork, Frank McSherry, Kobbi Nissim, and Adam Smith. 2006. Cali-
brating noise to sensitivity in private data analysis. In Theory of Cryptography
Conference (TCC). 265–284.
[8] C. Dwork and G. J. Pappas. 2017. Privacy in Information-Rich Intelligent Infras-
tructure. ArXiv e-prints (June 2017). arXiv:1706.01985
[9] Cynthia Dwork and Aaron Roth. 2014. The algorithmic foundations of differential
privacy. Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science 9, 3–4 (2014),
211–407.
[10] Úlfar Erlingsson, Vasyl Pihur, and Aleksandra Korolova. 2014. RAPPOR: Ran-
domized Aggregatable Privacy-Preserving Ordinal Response. In Proceedings of
the ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS).
1054–1067.
[11] European Association for Theoretical Computer Science. 2017. 2017
Gödel Prize. https://eatcs.org/index.php/component/content/article/1-news/
2450-2017-godel-prize.
[12] Justin Hsu, Marco Gaboardi, Andreas Haeberlen, Sanjeev Khanna, Arjun Narayan,
Benjamin C Pierce, and Aaron Roth. 2014. Differential privacy: An economic
method for choosing epsilon. In 27th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Sympo-
sium (CSF). 398–410.
[13] Ilya Mironov. 2012. On Significance of the Least Significant Bits for Differential
Privacy. In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Computer and Communi-
cations Security (CCS). 650–661.
[14] Ilya Mironov. 2017. Private Communication. (2017).
[15] Kobbi Nissim, Thomas Steinke, Alexandra Wood, Micah Altman, Aaron Bem-
benek, Mark Bun, Marco Gaboardi, David O’Brien, and Salil Vadhan. 2017. Dif-
ferential Privacy: A Primer for a Non-technical Audience (Preliminary Version).
(2017).
[16] Erica Portnoy, Gennie Gebhart, and Starchy Grant. Sep 27,
2016. In EFF DeepLinks Blog. www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/09/
facial-recognition-differential-privacy-and-trade-offs-apples-latest-os-releases.
[17] A.G. Thakurta, A.H. Vyrros, U.S. Vaishampayan, G. Kapoor, J. Freudiger, V.R.
Sridhar, and D. Davidson. 2017. Learning new words. (March 14 2017). https:
//www.google.com/patents/US9594741 US Patent 9,594,741.
[18] A.G. Thakurta, A.H. Vyrros, U.S. Vaishampayan, G. Kapoor, J. Freudiger, V.R.
Sridhar, and D. Davidson. 2017. Learning new words. (May 9 2017). https:
//www.google.com/patents/US9645998 US Patent 9,645,998.
[19] A.G. Thakurta, A.H. Vyrros, U.S. Vaishampayan, G. Kapoor, J. Freudinger, V.V.
Prakash, A. Legendre, and S. Duplinsky. 2017. Emoji frequency detection and
deep link frequency. (July 11 2017). https://www.google.com/patents/US9705908
Preprint, September 10, 2017, Jun Tang, Aleksandra Korolova, Xiaolong Bai, Xueqiang Wang, and Xiaofeng Wang
US Patent 9,705,908.
[20] Abhradeep Guha Thakurta. 2017. Differential Privacy: From Theory to Deploy-
ment. USENIX Association, Vancouver, BC.
[21] WWDC 2016. June, 2016. Engineering Privacy for Your Users. https://developer.
apple.com/videos/play/wwdc2016/709/.
[22] WWDC 2016. June, 2016. Platforms State of the Union. https://developer.apple.
com/videos/play/wwdc2016/102/.
[23] WWDC 2016. June, 2016. WWDC 2016 Keynote. https://www.apple.com/
apple-events/june-2016/.
[24] WWDC 2017. June, 2017. Privacy and Your Apps. https://developer.apple.com/
videos/play/wwdc2017/702.
A APPENDIX
A.1 Code Support for Findings
The code convention for Objective-C, which Hopper disassembles
the framework code to, is as follows. In an Objective-C function
name, the leading - means this is an instance method that can
only be accessed by an instance of the class, while + indicates the
method is a class method and can be accessed anytime by simply
referencing the class. The following [] includes both the function
name and argument name, and arguments are separated by : (an
example can be found in Figure 22).
A.1.1 Checking PrivacyParameter corresponds to the privacy pa-
rameter used in a datum’s privatization. For newwords, we observed
that the function _DPCMSSample initWith uses PrivacyParameter
to create the _DPBiasedCoin (see Figure 16 for Hopper code and
Figure 17 for our interpretation of it), and using runtime LLDB
we observed that the value is 1.0/(exp(PrivacyParameter ) + 1.0)
(Figure 20). Analogously, we analyzed the emoji randomization
code (Figure 22).
A.1.2 Checking that SessionAmount controls the daily budget
increase value. In the -[_DPPrivacyBudgetProperties initWithDic-
tionary:] function (Figure 18), the SessionAmount is assigned
to intervalBudgetValue. In the _DPPrivacyBudget updateAllBud-
getsIn function (Figure 19), we can see the value used to multiply
with the number of days since ZLASTUPDATE is r14, and
r14 = (r15 intervalBudgetValue) interValue).
So we can conclude that SessionAmount is used as the daily budget
increase value.
A.1.3 Hard-coded values. In addition to epsilonMAX and _kSec-
ondsInOneDay (Figure 14), the following constants are also hardoced
in the framework code: _kSecondsIn3Day, _kSecondsIn7Day, _kSec-
ondsIn14Day, _kSecondsIn12Hours, _kSecondsIn18Hours, _kSec-
ondsIn24Hours (Figure 15).
A.2 Aspects of the System that we don’t
Understand
Several details of the implementation’s behavior were puzzling:
• The privacy budget balance sometimes changes dramatically.
We observed this phenomenon twice over the course of 6
months. In both cases, the privacy budget increased and was
set to ZLASTU PDAT E−ZCREAT IONDATE86400 . We don’t know
the reason for this; one possibility is that the Apple server
triggered this change remotely.
• The daemon occasionally automatically stops data collection
and un-checks the boxes under Settings→ Security & Pri-
vacy (Figure 8) indicating opt-in to Analytics Sharing (and
hence, differential privacy). Over the course of our experi-
ments in the last 6 months, we observed this effect several
times. We were not able to reliably reproduce it. In particu-
lar, our experiments of setting the privacy budget balance
to zero or a negative number in the database or entering
thousands of emoji within a short period of time did not
trigger opt-out.
• When PrivacyParameter > epsilonMAX (Section 5.2), the
NewWords record will be inserted into the ZOBHRECORD
table, even though it is typically inserted into the ZCM-
SRECORD table.
• We don’t understand the role of testBudget, one of the 7
BudgetKeyNames.
A.3 Figures
Figure 8: Screenshot of the opt-in interface.
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Figure 9: Screenshot of Apple mentioning DP in “About An-
alytics and Privacy".
Figure 10: Five periodic maintenance tasks.
Figure 11: An example report file (located in /Li-
brary/Logs/DiagnosticReports/), which includes an Emoji
record and a (partial) NewWords record.
Figure 12: An example report file from iOS11.
Figure 13: Code snippet for fetch records to submit (0x28 =
40).
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Figure 14: epsilonMAX (equals to 2 if interpreted as a double
type number) and number of seconds in one day are hard-
coded in the code.
Figure 15: Example of other hardcoded variables.
Figure 16: Code snippet fromHopper for newword random-
ization (partial).
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Figure 17: Our interpretaion of the code snippet for new
word randomization (partial).
Figure 18: Code evidence that connects SessionAmount to
intervalBudgetValue.
Figure 19: Code evidence that connects intervalBudgetValue
to daily budget increase value.
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Figure 20: _DPBiasedCon value from LLDB.
Figure 21: A screenshot of Console.app, which includes output from 5 DP periodic tasks.
Figure 22: The emoji randomization code (partial) from Hopper Disassembler.
